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Narrowing the Scope of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Exception-SEx DISCRIMINATION IN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RiNS AFoULz
OF THE LAw-New York State Division of Human Rights v. New York-
Pennsylvania Baseball League
"Should a gentleman offer a lady a Tiparillo?" Such a question, popu-
larized in a familiar advertisement only a few years ago, gives one keen
insight into the stereotyped roles accepted for men and women during the
past decade. In sharp relief today, women's liberation groups would have
one believe that a man need not offer a woman anything; if she wants some-
thing, it is hers for the taking. Indeed, a recent national convention of
hardcore feminists, echoing this aggressive attitude and citing that women
compose fifty-three per cent of the nation's population, have warned that
they intend to capture a majority of the elected offices in the United States.1
While such groups2 admittedly have implemented some social progress, the
real moving force has been the federal courts, newly emboldened by the
potent elixir of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Not only have
the courts through this Act widely eliminated sex discrimination in the
recent past,8 but they have continued to do so, both on the state and federal
level, primarily through further interpretation in recent cases4 of the con-
1 U.S. NEws & WoRaL REPORT, Aug. 16, 1971, at 67.
2 See, e.g., Jacobsen, Women's Political Caucuses, Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1971,
(Potomac), at 11, which exemplifies a practical outgrowth of the liberation movement.
3 See Hollowell, Women and Equal Employment: From Romantic Paternalism to the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 56 WOMEN LAW. J. 28, 30 (1970).
4The courts have eliminated sex discrimination in diverse areas, although decisions
involving women in employment, especially industry, have occurred with the greatest
frequency. Several notable decisions have invalidated weight-lifting standards for women.
See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Utility Workers' Local 246
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co, 293
F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, - F.2d - (9th Cit. 1971). But see Gudbrandson
v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968). Likewise, courts have struck
down the discriminatory aspects of hours restrictions. See Ridinger v. General Motors
Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F.
Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ohio 1970). Courts have also eliminated limitations on women tending
bar. See McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970), on remand from
418 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1969); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners' Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne,
57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970). See also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385 (5th Cit. 1971), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1971), which effectively barred the
"female sex only" requisite for the position of flight cabin attendant.
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troversial "bona fide occupational qualification" exception5 to the Act.6
Specifically, the decision of New York State Division of Human Rights v.
New York-Pennsylvania Professional Baseball League,7 in striking another
blow against sex discrimination, further defined and logically narrowed the
"'bona fide occupational qualification" (hereinafter BFOQ) exception.
In the Baseball League case, one of first impression in New York, the
complainant was upheld in her effort to obtain employment as an umpire in
-a professional baseball organization, even though the management contended
that she did not meet the necessary height and weight standards.8 The base-
ball employer defended its refusal to hire the complainant on the basis of
the BFOQ exception.9 The court held, however, that a BFOQ must be
affirmatively proved by the party claiming it,10 and that the employer's evi-
dence that the job was physically taxing did not meet the necessary burden."
Moreover, the court felt that, in light of the defendant's testimony that a
woman meeting the physical qualifications would be accepted, being of
the male sex was not a BFOQ for the job.12 Likewise, the court concluded
that the employment standards requiring an applicant to be 5'10" in height
and 170 pounds in weight were unnecessary and inherently discriminatory,
especially when some male umpires in the past had not met these standards
-and only one per cent of all females in the nation could do so today.13
Thus, the issue, whether an employer may do indirectly that which he
may not do directly, emerged; more specifically, whether an employer may
circumvent a statutory ban on sex discrimination by setting physical stand-
ards for qualification which in themselves may be inherently discriminatory.
The court, in holding invalid sex discrimination of this type, based its de-
cision on two related aspects. First, it was necessary to determine whether
-size and weight standards were merely a vehicle for discrimination or were
in fact a BFOQ, bearing a reasonable relationship to the requirements of the
842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (1970).
642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1970).
7 36 App. Div. 2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971).
SThe complainant, a female 5'2" in height and 129 pounds in weight, with extensive
,experience in coaching little league teams and umpiring semi-professional league games,
applied for a position as an umpire with a small professional league. Although initially
dissuaded by the league president, she was subsequently given a contract which she ac-
cepted, and which was forwarded to the president of the National Association of Pro-
fessional Baseball Leagues. The president, in turn, disapproved her contract, contending
that she did not meet the necessary height and weight standards, and thus she could not
be considered. Id. at 366-68, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 790-92.
9 Id. at 368, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
10 Id. at 368, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
11 Id. at 368-69, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 792-93.
121 d. at 369, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
13 Id. at 369-70, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 793-94.
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job. The court felt that these requisites were unnecessary, despite the pos-
sibilty of physical depletion and confrontation with big athletes.' 4 Certainly
this is plausible: anyone with a rudimentary interest in baseball is aware
that an umpire need not protect himself, since with the simple toss of a
thumb he can eject any potential assailant. 15 As to the strain of the position,
the employers failed to prove why the job would be too strenuous for a
female.' 6 Indeed, never having tried women as umpires, such proof was
especially difficult to obtain. Thus, the court found that the defendant had
failed to establish that its specified physical standard is or ever was a BFOQ,
because the standard plainly bore no reasonable relationship to the job.
The second aspect on which the court based its decision involved the
question of equal application of the size requirement to all applicants. The
court found that some male applicants in the past, although not meeting the
size requirement, had performed satisfactorily as umpires.' 7 Because the
physical requisites had not been applied equally, the court had little trouble
in discounting the validity of the size requirement restriction.
The Baseball League decision is in accord with two previously decided
cases involving physical requirements relative to prospective female em-
ployees. The first case, Bo'we v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,'8 involved a manu-
facturer's seniority and job assignment policy restricting women to positions
which did not require lifting more than thirty-five pounds. The Seventh
Circuit held that the defendant could retain its thirty-five pound weight
lifting limit as a general guideline for all employees, male and female, but
each employee who was able to demonstrate that he could lift greater amounts
on a regular basis should be permitted to bid on and fill any position to
14 Id. at 370, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
15 Cf. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971)
which invalidated a state statute prohibiting the hiring of most women as bartenders.
The court rejected the "contention that a bartender must be physically strong enough
to protect himself against inebriated customers and to maintain order in the bar, and
that women as a class are unable to do so.. . "' Id. at 9, 485 P.2d at 537, 95 Cal. Rptr.
at 337. Moreover, the court stated that:
[T]here is no evidence that women bartenders are more likely than male bar-
tenders to suffer injury at the hands of customers. The desire to protect women
from the general hazards inherent in many occupations cannot be a valid ground
for excluding them from those occupations. . . . Women must be permitted to.
take their chances along with men when they are otherwise qualified and capable
of meeting the requirements of their employment.
Id. at 4, 485 P.2d at 534, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
Clearly the California court's reasoning is equally applicable to women performing
the duties of a professional baseball umpire.
16 See Schoenstein, Can You Really Go Play With The Boys?, SavrrrEN, June 1971,
at 28 (noting the lack of physiological differences between males and females).
17 36 App. Div. 2d 370, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
18416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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which his seniority might entitle him.19 The court specified "that it is best
to consider individual qualifications and conditions, such as physical capa-
bility, and physiological makeup of an individual, climatic condition, and
the manner in which the weight is to be lifted." 20
Likewise, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,21 the
defendant company, relying on a statute limiting to thirty pounds the weight
to be lifted by women, denied the female plaintiff a job as switchman on
the basis of her sex, despite the fact that she was the senior bidder. The
statute in question had been subsequently repealed and thus its validity was
not decided. However, the court ruled that no BFOQ existed and that the
defendant's conduct was unlawful under the Civil Rights Act, reasoning
that to rely on the BFOQ exception, an employer must bear the burden
of proving that he has a "factual basis for believing, that all or substantially
all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
the job involved." 22 Furthermore, Weeks noted that merely "labelling a
job as 'strenuous' simply does not meet the burden of proving that the job
is within the bona fide occupational qualification exception." 23 Several
other cases featuring comparable factual situations have rendered essentially
the same results.2 4
A brief consideration of Bowe and Weeks, in comparison with the Base-
ball League case, reveals the soundness of the last named decision in its
application of the BFOQ exception. One immediate observation is that
in both Bowe and Weeks the employer labelled the job "strenuous," based
an employment requirement on arbitrary weight limits, and contended
without substantiation that a woman could not reasonably accomplish the
task. The Baseball League case is analogous, in that the League had con-
trived an arbitrary standard for an applicant's height and weight. Upon
further analysis, however, it appears that the rationale of the Weeks deci-
sion, more so than that of Bowe, more closely parallels and substantiates
the court's holding in Baseball League.25 Whereas Bowe indicated that an
19 !d. at 718.
20 Id. at 718.
21408 F.2d 228 (5th Cit. 1969).
22ld. at 235. But see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), rev'g
411 F.2d 1 (5th Ci. 1968) (suggesting that the BFOQ exception could be broader).
23 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co, 408 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cit. 1969).
24 See, e.g., Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971);
Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969);
Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
2 5 It would seem that the court could have obtained the same result had it followed
the Bowe test instead. By the Bowe test, the League could have kept some size standard
as a general guideline for all applicants, but allowed an applicant not meeting the
standard to demonstrate that he or she could in fact effectively perform the duties of
f9721
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employer must consider each applicant as an individual, Weeks emphasized
that an employer must demonstrate that substantially all women as a class
could not meet the requirements of the job. Conceding, however,, thatl
Baseball League does essentially follow Weeks, perhaps the New York
court would have obtained the same result solely on the basis of the
League's haphazard application of its own standard. Unlike the employers
in Bo'we and Weeks who patently employed distinct standards for women,
the employer in Baseball League, while allegedly applying the same standard
to both sexes, undermined its own defense by previously having employed
male applicants who did not satisfy the controversial standard. Thus, even
if the League's size and weight standard had been found valid in itself, it
would have been held ineffective because of the inconsistencies in past hiring
practices.
The underlying significance of Baseball League, then, is that while it was
argued and decided much like Weeks and Bowe, it differs factually. Conse-
quently, the decision narrows the scope of the BFOQ exception by adding
to the list of outlawed practices 26 a requirement which ostensibly does not
discriminate, but which in fact discriminates against women by eliminating
all but a small number who can qualify.2 7 In addition to continuing the
the position involved. Had the League considered the appellant on an individual basis,
in view of her past experience and performance, doubtless she could have satisfactorily
demonstrated the necessary ability. However, the court seemed more concerned with
the League's contention that substantially all women could not adequately perform, and
with the League's lack of evidence to support its contention. Nevertheless, in an em-
ployment situation such as in the instant case where the applicants are relatively few
in number, the individual consideration suggested in Bowe appears both practical and
equitable, and hence more desirable.
26 One source has divided the types of prohibited sex discrimination into three
general classifications: explicit sex discrimination; "sex-plus some other factor" dis-
crimination; and discrimination based on statistical differences. Note, Developments
in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1170-76 (1971). See Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment
Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 326,
350-371 (1971); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 686-694.
27 In the parallel area of racial discrimination, the courts have struck down seemingly
neutral standards and "tests" which have been used by employers as a means to per-
petuate discrimination. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) where the
Court stated:
What Congress has forbidden is giving . . . devices and mechanisms controlling
force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better
qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifica-
tions as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so
that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has
commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not
the person in the abstract. Id. at 436.
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-trend of narrowly construing the BFOQ, this case strongly suggests the
possibility of. future litigation in professional sports. 28 Legislative intent
indicates that a BFOQ should be sustained in this area,2 9 as might business
necessity 30 and customer preference,31 if such are valid tests. However, the
28Already, women's attempts to gain entry into certain heretofore all male profes-
sional sports have generated some litigation. Two recent decisions, although not
based upon Title VII, have permitted women to compete as jockeys. In Rubin v.
Florida State Racing Comm'n, No. 6819113 (11th Cir., Dade County, Fla., 1968), the
Florida State Racing Commission, under an alternative writ of mandamus, issued an
apprentice jockey's license to the female petitioner; accord, Kusner v. Maryland Racing
Comm'n, No. 37,044 (Cir. Ct, Prince George's County, Md., 1968), where the court
found the Maryland Racing Commission's previous refusal to issue a jockey's llcense.-to
the female plaintiff had been sex based, and thus ordered the Commission to issue the
license. See SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 2, 1971, at 44, which notes the similar progress
women have made in bowling. Likewise, women have broken the sex barrier and have
made brief appearances in the more popular spectator sports. One intrepid young
female, playing several games for a Florida semi-professional football team, held the
ball on point-after-touchdown kicks; another young woman recently tried-out for one
of the minor league baseball affiliates of the Washington Senators. N.Y. Times, Aug.
22, 1971, § v,, at 3, col. 8.
29 A memorandum of Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of Title VII, stated
that the limiting of a professional baseball team to males only should exemplify
legitimate discrimination under the BFOQ exception. 110 CONG. Rxc. 7213 (1964).
Doubtless this example would apply to the other major team spectator sports, basket-
ball and football. Moreover, in sports where frequent physical contact is essential
(e.g., football) conceivably EEOC guidelines would sustain sex as a BFOQ should the
deference to cultural taboos involving bodily intimacy receive liberal interpretation.
See note 32 inffra.30 See Comment, "Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 Du=a L.J. 671, which recognized that a
baseball team might hire only male players, commenting that such action might be
based upon business necessity:
[Such [an] application [of the BFOQ] could easily be based upon considerations
other thaA player or crowd attitude, such as the cost of installing additional
dressing room facilities. Id. at 698 & n.134. I*
But see GUIDELINES OR DiscRiMiNATIoN BECAUSE OF SEx, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (1) (ivy
(1971). See generally Eastern Greyhound v. New York State Div. of Human Rights,
27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1970), wherein the court, discussing
business necessity in the related area of discrimination against creed, held that a
"[p]olicy resting on a desire to promote business by greater public support could justifj,
the exclusion by an employer of beards and have no possible religious connotation."
Id. at 281, 265 N.E.2d at 746, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 325. But see Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1971), wherein the
court stated:
[T]he use of the word "necessary" in [the BFOQ] requires that we apply a
business necessity test, not a business convenience test. That is to say, discrimina-
tion based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would
be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively. Id. at 388.
See Note, A Woman's Place: Diminishing Justifications for Sex Discrimination in
Employment, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 183, 196-97, 200 (1969).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
decided cases involving sex discrimination demonstrate with increasing
frequency that only BFOQ's based on extreme necessity will be upheld.3a.
The instant case supports this observation and reinforces the desirable trend
toward sexual equality in employment practices. If the overall intent of the
Civil Rights Act is to be achieved, women must be given equal opportunity
in all facets of employment, and sports should be no exception.
J.L.K.
SlAt least one source has suggested that customer preference may substantiate a
male-only BFOQ in professional sports, commenting that:
[A] professional baseball team is designed to satisfy the customer's desire to,
see a skillful exhibition of the game. Although there may be a few women who-
possess the requisite ability, this is surely the exception rather than the rule.
Therefore, utilizing the EEOC approach, the owner is allowed to hire only male
ball players because surely there would be no difficulty in establishing that all
or substantially all women could perform at the same level. Note, Title VII-Sexual.
Discrimination in Employment-Female Sex as a BFOQ for Position of Airlint
Cabin Attendant, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 242, 249 (1971).
But of. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
- U.S. - (1971), wherein the court severely limited the use of customer preference in-
establishing a BFOQ:
While we recognize that the public's expectation of finding one sex in a par-
ticular role may cause some initial difficulty, it would be totally anomalous if we
were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine
whether sex discrimination was valid .... Thus, we feel that customer preference
may be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to-
perform the primary function or service it offers. Id. at 389.
Similarly, the EEOC guidelines state that a BFOQ should not be established "because
of the preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients, or customers . . . .' 29 C.F.R.
S 1604.1 (a) (1) (iii) (1971). Several courts have noted that these guidelines are entitled
to "great deference." Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Other authorities,
however, have specified that these guidelines have no force or effect of law, and thus
are not binding. See Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc, 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1971); Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984,
989 (N.D. Cal. 1969); American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp.
1100, 1103 (D.D.C. 1968).
32See, e.g., Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970), noting
that "[tihe kind of 'customer preference' reflected in the hospital's assignment of order-
lies to perform certain services for male patients otherwise assignable to aides is cog-
nizable under Title VII." Id. at 727. Indeed, the EEOC would seem to sustain sex as
a BFOQ, in deference to cultural taboos in jobs involving bodily intimacy (restroom
attendant, orderlies or nurses aides); where sex is needed for authenticity or genuine-
ness (actor or actress); or for positions in which sex appeal is the essence (topless
waitress). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (2) (1971); EQUAL EMPLOYM NT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, TowARD JOB EQUALITY FOR WoMEN 5-6 (1969). See generally, Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1183-86 (1971).
